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Global Capital Flows:
Maximising Benefits,
Minimising Risks
JOSEPH P. DANIELS

Recent events in the world economy have demonstrated that a strengthening
of the system is needed to maximize the benefits of, and reduce the risks
posed by, global economic and financial integration .
- Report ofthe Finance Ministers to the Koln Economic Summit

Introduction

Much has been made of the role of capital flows and financial speculators in
the context of global integration. Yet in much of the literature on reforms to
the international financial system , it is taken for granted that the econom ic
benefits of broader and deeper liberalised financial markets and the economic
role that speculators play in these markets is well understood. In the early
I990s, the industrialised countries, particularly the United States and Europe,
have unabashedly promoted financial liberalisation as the obvious and
inevitable policy choice for developing and emerging economies.
Following the financial crises of 1994 and 1997, however, criticism of
globalised financial markets for their shortcomings has been unremitting.
Various policy-making fora have also followed this path, concentrating on
risks and considering ways in which to contain the level or constrain the pace
of financial liberalisation and global activities of financial speculators, as
opposed to promoting the benefits of continued Iiberalisation as they once
had. Because of advances in telecommunications and financial engineering,
continuing integration of financial markets appears inevitable.
If history has anything to offer us, as James (1999) argues, liberalisation
can be reversed. The lack of clear and consistent leadership in international
economics may explain, in part, the recent surge in isolati oni sm and
protectionism . Leadership in this complicated issue area requires close
11 3
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attention to the normative and positive aspects of financial libe rali sation in
order to gain credibility to co-ordinate at the internatio nal level and advocate
at the national level.
Capital market liberalisation has become an appealing goa l to man y
nations because of the perceived allocative benefits and effic iency gains. The
risks inherent in this process, however, have been made painfull y obv io u
and, as a result, policy makers have elected to "re form " the financial system meaning measures des igned to prevent possible crises and better manage
those that do occur - so as to maximise said benefits while minimising the
risks. The overall purpose of this chapter is to offer an understanding of the
basis for a strengthening or reform of the international financial system and,
therefore, the rationale behind the preventative reforms advanced by the G7
Finance Ministers. It seeks to add to the existing literature by identifying and
discussing, in an accessible manner, the root benefits of capital market
liberalisation, the risks and imperfections inherent itl capital markets. and the
constraints that liberalised capital markets place o n the conduct of
m icroeconom ic and macroeconom ic po licies. The role of finan c ial speculators
in the recent financial crises in East Asian is also cons idered . In tead of
offering yet another list of reform proposal s. this chapter focusses o n those
proposals most likely to be acted upon, that is, those drafted by the G7
Finance Ministers in Strengthening the International Financial Architecture.
Rep ort o/the G 7 Finance Ministers to the K61n Economic Summit. Finally,
as the members of the G7 are the architect of the current international
financial system, they have key responsibilities in its refo rm and manageme nt.
We outline these responsibilities in the final section.
The conclusion drawn here is that the G7 has put forward wo rthy
proposals for reducing variability and for respondin g to and containing future
crises. These proposals should be acted on with haste. The G7 ha s fallen
short, however, in providing the likely victims of future crises. the la rger
emerging and developing economies, with so lid working proposals and
examples appropriate to the conditions of these econom ies and broader
participation in the reform process . The G7 Ministers' report implies that
market participants will continue to be the principal agents press ing the
integration of the financial systems of the major developed economies with
those of the emerging and developing econom ies . Likewise the ma rket wi II
continue to be the primary supervisor of macroeconomic and exc han ge rate
policies, rewarding nations with sound and credible policy and punishing
those without. Nonetheless, the G7 has key res pon s ibilities in the reform
process and in managing these markets .

Global Capital Ffaws: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Risks 115

Benefits of International Capital Flows
Advocates of capital market liberalisation argue that unhindered capita l
movements a llow savings to flow to their most productive use and, therefore,
financial speculators play an important and beneficial role as they are the
agents that provide liquidity, regardless of host location , to projects with
potentially high marginal products. Those projects that do eventuate in hi gh
returns reward speculators for the ri sk they have assumed. In thi s way,
resources are directed in the most efficient pattern , resulting in real sector
development and productivity increases. Financia l speculators, therefore, take
the risky s ide ofa financial transaction and provide essentia l liquidity to the
economy .
With access to foreign capital, domestic households and bu s inesses may
expand their lending and borrowing activ iti es abroad, a llowing agents to
continue to spend and invest during domestic economic downturns and repay
during periods of economic growth, thereby mitigating typical business
cyc les. Hence, domestic agents can diversify savings internationally and
reduce their exposure to domestic economic shocks. These positive aspects
reinforce capita l flows as domestic residents enjoy higher risk-adjusted rates
of return, spurring yet higher levels of sav in g and investment activity. In turn,
increased saving and investment induce additiona l economic growth .
For developing nations in particular, access to g loba l capita l reduces the
cost offinanci ng investment projects considerab ly. More investment projects
are undertaken, leading to real sector development. In the long run, this
translates into higher standards ofliving as higher rates of growt h are enjoyed.
Private specu lative capita l, therefore, may substitute fo r uncertain
development aid that often comes w ith inefficiency costs a sociated with
bureaucratic red tape and constraints.

The Role of Financial Intermediaries
For specu lative capita l flows to del iver prom ised real sector development and
growth, a well-developed system of financial intermediaries is required .
Pagano ( 1993) identifies three key functions of financial intermed iation that
lead to economic growth. The first is funnelling savings to firms wit h
minimum x-inefficiencies. The process of intermediation absorbs a fraction
of each dollar of savings so that less than one dollar is invested . An efficient
system of intermediaries faces low reserve requ irements, transaction taxes and
unnecessary regulation , reducing these inefficiencies.
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Secondly, financial intermediaries make it poss ible for man y people to
pool their funds together, thereby increasing the size, or scale. of the amount
of total amount ofsavings managed by a central authority. This centralisation
of management can reduce average fund-management costs be low the level s
that savers would incur if they were to manage their savi ngs a lone. thereby
enjoying financial economies of scale. In thi s way. intermediaries may
increase the amount of savings ultimately invested by reduc ing unnecessary
costs.
Another outcome of an efficient system of intermediaries is the reduction
of information asymmetries and an improvement of capital allocation and
market stability. An information asymmetry exists when one party to a
transaction, say a borrower, has more or better information than does the other
party, the lender. For financial markets in particular, information asymmetries
can lead to a number of potential problems including inefficient allocation of
avings, herding behaviour. and even financial cr"sis. Intermediaries who
specialise in the assessment of the quality of debt in struments and
continuously monitor the performance of firms that issue these instruments
are able to reduce the degree of information imperfections.
Intermediaries also provide a means for savers to pool risk. If savers are
unable to pool risk, they will invest in the most liquid projects. More
productive but less liquid projects are not financed , resulting in lowe r
potential economic growth. Hence, intermediaries playa key three-part role :
relying on their informational capabilities, they evaluate investment projects
and determine those with the highest marginal product and then induce savers
to invest in higher risk but more profitable projects through ri sk sharing at
reduced average costs.

Financial Sec/or Developmenl and Economic Growlh
Reduced costs, hig her quality information , and the poo ling of ri sk are o nl y
some of the ways in which intermediaries may affect the rate of aving in an
economy. Economic theory shows, however, that tinancial secto r
development may either increase or decrease saving and th e effect 0 11
economic growth is unclear a priori. Improvements in hedg ing instruments
may reduce precautionary saving and improvements in hou e ho ld credit
markets may allow agents to di ssave in favour of current consumption o r lowmarginal-benefit projects. Hence, if financial development induces lower
sav ing. economic growth Illay suffer.
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One view on the contribution of the financial sector is that lo ng- run trend
performance is determined solely by real sector development. An alternative
view is that the development of the financial sector alters econom ic
fundamentals and, therefore, alters long-run performance. Why financial
development evolves differently across econom ies and the casual relation ship
between financial development and real sector growth is still unclear. Recent
empirical literature, however, supports the view that financial development
does indeed affect economic growth. Eatwell and Taylor (1998) argue,
therefore, that the ultimate measure of a system of intermed iaries is the effect
on the real sector of the economy .

Misallocation of Capital
The fact that " reform " of the international financial system is being widely
discussed is an admittance that unhindered financial markets do not achieve
the utopian view of effic ient capital allocation expressed above . Such an
outcome is the quintessence that one would like to see reached , but there are
a numberofmarket imperfections and policy-created distortions that cause the
system to fall short. In the presence of a deep and well-regulated system of
intermediaries, financial development and capital market liberali sation may
positively affect the path of potential long-run growth. Yet, under lesser
conditions, intermediaries may channel capital flows in ways that underm ine
domestic policies, increase shocks and contagion, and trigger financial crises
(Crockett, 1997, p. 7). The benefits of efficient capital allocation described
above may be offset and economic growth actually suffer.
The potential costs of financial crises is well documented in the literature.
For example, it is believed that the costs of the 1980s banking crisis in
Argentina equalled one-half of the nation 's GDP, while the United States '
bailout of banks during the early 1990s totalled at least US$200 billion . The
1995 real estate collapse in Japan resulted in the nonperformance of more
than US$250 billion in bank loans . In South Korea more than 10 percent o f
all bank loans are nonperforming, and for India and China nonperformin g
loans are estimated to be nearly 20 percent of outstanding loan s. Since 1980,
the International Monetary Fund (1M F) estimates that 133 of 181 1M F
member nations have suffered banking problems it considers to be
"s ignificant" (Lindgren, et al. 1996).
The conclusion is that there are potential allocative and efficiency ga ins
to be enjoyed from liberalising capital markets . A well-developed and
regulated system of intermediaries is necessary for these ga ins to be realized.
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T his is not a sufficie nt cond it io n, however, as there are po licy-c reated
d istort io ns a nd fi nanc ia l markets imperfectio ns that mu st be dea lt wi th . Wi th
th e potenti a l benefits of fin a nc ia l specul ati o n and the importa nce of a we lldeve lo ped fin anc ia l market in cha nne lling g lo ba l funds outlined. the ri ks a nd
po licy constra ints inherent in libera li sed fi na nc ia l markets are cons idered
next.

Financial Markets and Economic Policy
• T here are a number of potenti a l imperfect io ns and ri sks inherent in Ii nanc ia l
markets. It is useful to foc us o n th ose th at are centra l to the stabi lity of g loba l
ca pi ta l ma rkets. For libera li sed ca pita l markets to function at the leve l o r
practi ca l ex pectatio ns, m icroecono m ic and macroeco no m ic po l ic ies mu st be
consistent w ith an environm ent of free- fl ow in g caiJi ta l. To pro mote sta bili ty
of the syste m, these po li cy constra ints must be rea lised and res pected, po li cyc reated di sto rtio ns m inimi sed, and imperfec tio ns addressed .

Risks. Distortions. and Microecol1omic Policy
O ne ty pe of market imperfecti on, th at of asy mm etri c info rm atio n. is be li eved
by some economists to pervade tinanc ia lm arkets in particu lar (E ic hengreen,
e l al. 1999). As di scussed a bove, asy mmetri c infor matio n ca n induce an
ineffic ie nt di stribution of capita l and increased ma rket vo latility. Two key
pro bl e ms assoc iated wi th info rm atio n asy mmetries are adverse se lectio n and
he rdin g behav io ur. In fin a nc ia l tra nsactions, le nde rs are often not privy to a ll
of the info rm at io n - pa rtic ularl y in fo rm atio n abo ut ri sk - regard ing a ca pita l
investme nt proj ect. T he ex istence of an inform ation ga p betwee n savers and
bo rrowers can res ult in adve rse selection. or the potentia l for those w ho des ire
funds fo r un worthy projects to be the most like ly to want to borrow o r to iss ue
de bt in strum e nts. A res ult of adverse se lection is that the iss uance of poorqua lity instrum ents ca n make savers less w illing to lend to o r ho ld de bt
in strum ents iss ued by those seekin g to ti na nce hig h-qua lity p r~iec t s (Da nie ls
and Va nHoose 1999). Additi ona ll y, poor info rmati on may res ult in he rd in g
be hav io ur. T hat is, in the presence of inform atio n ga ps. avers fo llow the
be hav io ur of someone e lse they fee l is bette r info rm ed. In a g lo ba l co ntext,
he rdin g be hav io ur can be a catalyst for contag io n a nd spreadin g financ ia l
insta bility to regiona l leve ls. Herdin g be hav io ur ca n a lso lead to a red uctio n
of asset prices or currency va lues th at greatl y exceeds what is warranted.
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In g lo ba l ca pita l markets, the pro blem o f info rm ati on asy mm etri es ca n be
extens ive as multinatio nal e nterpri ses engage in transacti on spa nnin g the
g lobe. Hig h-quality interm ediaries are able to reduce the degree of
asy mm etric informati on by hav ing offi ces around the world , creating
economi es of sca le in inform ati on process ing. By continuo us ly monito rin g
and evaluating the performance and acti v ities of multinati ona l e nterpri ses,
they are a ble to reduce, a lbe it not e liminate, info rmati on asy mm etri es a nd
the re by encourage sav ings and reduce herdin g behav io ur.
An other potenti a l pro bl em is that of mo ral haza rd . that is the bo rrower
e ngages in behav io ur that increases ri sk after the de bt in strum e nt has been
purchased. Aga in interm edi aries are abl e to reduce mo ra l haza rd by
continuo us ly mo nito rin g the perfo rma nce of the borrower. In the context of
g lo ba l capital markets and in Iight of recent fin a nc ia l c ri ses, mora l haza rd may
a rises when a domestic government implic itly g ua rantees that a tirm o r ba nk
w ill not be a llowed to fa il. Internati onal o rga nisations. such as the IM F. have
a lso been accu sed of creating mo ra l haza rd when stand ing by ready to ba i l o ut
sovere ig n natio ns facin g a liquidity cris is.
.
Fina ll y, capita l fl ows may res po nd to po li cy-c reated d isto rtio ns. leadin g
to a n in efficie nt and capric ious a ll ocati on of capita l. Cooper ( 1999) po ints o ut
that di ffe renti a l nati ona l taxa tio n, trade restri cti o ns. and macroeco no m ic
po lic ies are but a fe w po licy-created disto rti ons that may lead to a
mi sallocatio n of capital. In addition. d ifferenti a l natio na l regul atio n o n
finan c ia l transactio ns may ge nerate regulatory arbitrage. whe n do mestic
in stitutions e ither locate abroad or conduct certa in ty pes of o peratio ns a broad
in o rder to avo id domesti c regulati o n a nd supe rvis ion. Thi s miti gates the
regulato ry abiliti es of governments and exposes domestic inte rm edia ri es to
the very ty pes of ri sk regulators seek to minimi se. T hese di sto rtions result
fro m do mestic microeco nomic po lic ies yet need to be judged in a n
internatio na l context as we ll. Without pro pe r intern ati ona l co-ope ratio n a nd
co-ordinati on. there exists a potenti a l " race to the botto m ' o r a move to th e
regulatory and tax e nvironm ent of the least strin ge nt nati on.

Financial Markel Liberalisalion and Macroeconomic Policy
Financ ia l market libera lisati on a lso constra in s mac roecono mic po l icy in ways
determined by the exchange rate reg im e, o ne of the most impo rta nt
macroecono mic in stitutional cho ices a natio n faces . For develo pin g nati o ns.
the exchange rate is an extreme ly impo rtant no min a l price that affec ts ex po rt
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performance. the cost of important commodities and inputs. a nd directing
business planning and investment. Peggi ng the exchan ge rate. therefo re. is an
attractive option. The well-known " impossible trinity" of lixed exchan ge
rates, capital mobility, and discretionary monetary policy prescribes that the e
three conditions cannot exist s imultaneou s ly and po licy makers must be
willing to forgo one aspect. I For developing, transitional , and emerging
nations seeking to gain exchange rate stability and domestic price credibility
through pegged-exchange rates while liberalising financial markets to take
advantage of cheaper foreign financing, the lesson is that monetary authorities
must be independent and conduct policy in a manner consistent with the first
two objectives. This means that discretionary monetary policy via sterilised
foreign exchange interventions is not sustainable in the long run. The typical
outcome of countries trying to practice all three is an overvalued currency and
inevitable devaluation. In turn, the devaluation focusses attention o n the
improper past conduct of monetary policy and "the loss of credibility is
dramatic. As a result, the devaluation often leads to a complete collapse of the
exchange rate regime and eventual floating of the currency until a new trading
floor is found and the currency stabi Iises .
Developing nations, therefore, face a dilemma; should they c hoose fixed
or flexible exchange rates? Cooper (1999), an advocate of a common world
currency, see the only practical choices as being flexible exchan ge rates and
some type of capital controls or capital market liberali sat ion and strong ly
fixed exchange rates with the complete loss of di scretionary policy . With
capital market liberalisation, a developing nation with a flexible exchange rate
regime wi II experience a high Iy volati Ie exchange rate that respo nds primari Iy
to the flow offoreign capital and, as a res ult, will be driven to capital controls .
Otherwise, full capital mobility requires these nations to adopt a true fixed
exchange rate regime with the loss of monetary policy, such as in Hon g Kong
or Argentina.
A pegged exchange rate regime, such as that employed in Thailand,
Indonesia, and Malaysia prior to the fall of 1997 is problematic in
combination with capital market liberalisation 2 A key consideration is that
under a pegged-exchange-rate regime, currency ri sk is shifted. to a given
degree, from private market participants to the governm e nt. To private agents,
the marginal benefit of employing hedg in g instruments appears less than the
marginal cost. Many foreign exchange ex posures, therefore, go unh edged and
the foreign currency denominated debt of firms and businesse will balloon
with a devaluation . According to Cooper, at the point when authorities reali se
that the exchange rate needs to be devalued so do private market participants
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a nd c urrency spec ul ators, who a re a ble to profit at the ex pe nse of nati o na l
reserves. Furthe r, as fo re ign c urrency indebted bus ines es scrambl e to buy up
reserves so a5 to hedge the ir ex posure, they exert s ignifica nt downwa rd
pressure o n the va lue of the do me tic c urre ncy. The o utcome is a free- fa lling
excha nge va lue. T hi s is co mbined w ith the fact th at the G 7 nati o ns lac k an
excha nge rate policy that prov ides for lo ng-te rm stability a mo ng the ir
c urrencies. What thi s mean s for deve loping countries that choose to peg to
o ne o r mo re of these currenc ies is that eventua ll y, a reva luati o n o r
devaluation is in ev itabl e. If the conduct of macroeconomic po licy o r
mi croecono mi c reform was wa nting in the interim, o r if the adjustm e nt to
pa rity was postpo ned too long, markets are like ly to ma ke these nati o ns pay
harshl y fo r the ir sho rtcomings.
Another concern regardin g fin anc ia l libera li satio n, somewhat sepa rate
fro m the cho ice o f exchange rate regim e, is the potentia l loss of mo netary
contro l. As po inted out by William son a nd Maha r ( 1998), nati o ns that
practi sed monetary po licy thro ugh capital control s ty pi call y do not have a ny,
o r least not we ll-developed, money and bo nd markets. Re mov ing these
control s leaves a utho rities with no means to contro l mo netary gro wth thro ugh
o pen-ma rket operati ons. Eventuall y libe ra li sati on leads to the deve lo pme nt of
governm ent securities markets and mo neta ry contro l is re to red . T he
transi tio n peri od, howeve r, may prove to be quite un stable, prov iding one
ex pla nati on of why many nations ex pe ri ence a fin anc ia l c ri s is fo ll ow in g
libe ra li sation.

The Role of Foreign Capital in Recent Crises
Befo re movin g on to cons ider the appro pri ateness of reform s, it is impol1ant
to first cons ide r the ro le of fo re ign speculato rs. At the time o f the East As ian
cri s is, Ma lays ian Prime Mini ster Mah athir Mo hamad bl a med fo re ig n
speculators fo r the fi nanc ia l c ri s is that eng ulfed the regio n, sparking a bi tte r
de bate w ith the likes of George Soros. Did fo re ign spec ulators trul y ca use the
fin anc ia l cri s is in the ir bl ind pu rs uit of pro fit, 'a some c la imed? O r, as a rgued
by other, was it the res ult of impro per macroeco nom ic a nd m icroecono m ic
po li c ies?
Now that some tim e has passed s ince the sta rt of the East As ia n c ri s i ,
empirical assessments of the cri s is are beginning to materia li se . T ho ugh the
evidence so fa r is rather scant, it SuppOI1S the noti on that fo re ign speculato rs
were 110 1 the cause of the cris is. One of the most recent studies, by C lloe, Kilo,
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a nd Stul z ( 1999), cons iders the ro le o f fo re ign in vestors in the co ll a p e of the
Ko rean stoc k ma rket in 1997. T he autho rs show that the mark et adjusted
qui ckl y to sales by fore ign in vesto rs and that negati ve abnorm a l return s we re
not pers iste nt fo llow ing fo re ig n sa les. T he a uth ors prov ide ev ide nce of
herdin g behav io ur by fo re ig n in vestors but conv inc in g ly a rg ue that uch
be haviour need not be desta bili s ing. The ir res ults show that do mesti c buy ing
activity dominated fo re ign se llin g activity in the last three month s of 1997.
He nce, there is no ev ide nce that fore ign speculators we re a desta bi Iis ing fo rce.
Regardin g Tha iland , Laurid sen ( 1999) conc ludes that pri va te sector
intermediaries m isha nd led sho rt-te rm capita ls fl ows lead ing to a m isa ll ocatio n
of capital. Tho ug h, in the autho r's o pini on, thi s is the main cause of the cri ses,
it was acco mpan ied by po l iti ca l instabi Iity a nd mi smanageme nt. Jo mo ( 1999)
co ncludes th at the re li ance on sho rt-term finan c in g, specul ati o n aga inst the
c urre ncy- basket peg, and injudi c ious po l icy res po nse led to the co lla p e of
the Ma lays ian rin gg it. The " Tequila C ri ses" o f 1994- 1995 is exa mined in a
spec ia l vo lume of the Journal of Banking and Finance, edited by Ca lo m iri s
( 1999). Th o ug h the rev iew o f the lite rature o n thi s epi sode shows some
disagreeme nt o n the ro le of specul ato r , w hat is appa rent is th at is was
pro bl e ms in macroecono mi c a nd mi croeconomic fund amenta ls th at made
Mexico "v ulnerable to the w him s of specul ato rs" (p. 145 8).
Finally, in a theoretica l context, Aghio n, Bacc hetta, a nd B a n e ~j ee ( 1999)
show that econom ies at an interm edi ate leve l of fin anc ia l deve lopm e nt a re
mo re unstable than econo mi es w ith e ithe r full y deve loped o r underdevelo ped
fin ancial markets. As a res ult, inte rmedi ate eco nomies that unde rgo fin a nc ia l
libe ra li sati on may desta bili se the ir econo mi es . Fo re ign direct in vestm e nt,
however, is not destabili s ing. The autho rs suggest, therefo re, th at econo mies
w ith finan c ial ma rkets at an intermedi ate stage of deve lo pm e nt sho uld
care full y plan and pace finan c iallibera li satio n, all owin g FDI but re tri cting
po rtfolio fl ows. The importa nce of creatin g incenti ves fo r FDI is add res ed
by Al an Ru gman in a later chapter of thi s text.
Hence, the Iiterature suggests that the sources of these fin anc ia l cri ses li es
in the mi x of inappropriate mac roecono mic po li cy and in adequate
microecono mic re form co upl ed w ith capita l mark et libera li sati on. as o ppo ed
to fo re ign specul ati on. Wheth er o ne bl ame pecul ato rs, the conduct of
m ic roecono m ic a nd mac roeconom ic po lic ies. o r the leve l o f tinanc ia I
deve lo pme nt for the fin anc ia l cri es of th e 1990s, the prev io us secti on or lh i
cha pter d emo nstrate th e overarc hing importance of a we ll-deve lo ped. hi ghqu a lity syste m of finan c ia l inte rmedi aries. F inanc ia l inte rm edi ari es ex ist to
save potentia l ho lders o f fin anci a l in strum e nts fro m inc urrin g the ri sks and
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a ll ow in g them to enjoy red uced costs. the reby enco uragi ng financial
speculat ion in the most effic ient sectors of the econo my. In tUI'll . speculators
provide the most pro mi sing sectors of the eco no my w ith the li q uidity needed
to deve lop and ex pa nd. Whil e these in stitutions ca nnot e lim inate adve r e
se lecti o n and mora l hazard pro ble ms. they ca n co ll ect in fo rm ation abo ut the
underl y ing ri skiness of fin anc ia l in strum ents and mo nito r the cont inuin g
perfo rm ance of those w ho issue such in strum e nts, the re by redu c in g the extent
of these pro ble ms in fi nanc ia l markets .

Preventative Policy: G7 Recommendations
With the benefi ts a nd risks of unh indered cap ita l flows cons idered. what type
a nd to w hat extent sho ul d reform effo rts take? Shou ld th ere be a new
intern ationa l fina nc ia l archi tecture. o r sho uld reform s be modest? Eic he ng reen
( 1999, p. 9) ma kes a compe lling, tho ugh blun t, argume nt aga in st proposa ls
th at are too grandiose. c la iming th at they are impractica l a nd have " not ' a
snowba ll ' s c hance in he ll of be ing imple me nted". G ive n th e compl ex and
dy namic nature of the system, one mu st rea li e that the re is no definiti ve
answer to the quest io ns proposed here. T hus. the re w ill be cons id e rab le
d isagreement on reform s that are com plex an d broa d sweep ing. As such.
gra nd proposa ls are non-starters in the c urrent po li t ica l env iro nm ent.
As stated at the o utset of thi s c hapte r. th e o bjective of po l icy and reform
shou ld be to max imi se the benefits w hil e m inimi s ing the risks assoc iated with
capita l market libe ra li sation. T he li terat ure has shown that libera lisat io nneed
to be paced acco rdin g to the level of fi nancia l deve lo pm ent the nat io n fi nds
itse lf at. Mic roecono mic po li cy actio ns sho uld free trade fl ows. e ncourage
fl ex ibility and competition, and improve regul ation a nd superv is io n o f the
nation s system of interm edi aries. T he dee penin g of th e market fo r
gove rnment debt is essent ia l fo r contro lling the mo ney suppl y and a llow in g
for d irect fi na nc ing. T he ability to fi na nce directly redu ces the impact of
ba nking c rises on the real secto r of the econo my a nd prov ides ~or lo ng-run
sta bili ty.
.
In eva lu at in g the GTs proposa ls des igned to prevent po ible future
cri ses, thi s section reviews those put fo rwa rd in the Repo rt of the Fin ance
M inisters to the K6 1n Economic Summi t ( ee the a ppend ix fo r the full text of
the Re port). Beginning in Ha li fax a nd co ntinuin g in Lyo n. the Fina nce
Mini ste rs were requested by the leaders to identi fy key areas o f refo rm in the
in te rn atio na l fin anc ia l system and to re po rt on in iti ati ves pri or to the summ its.
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The Ka ln Report. therefo re. is a doc um e nt that has been in constru ctio n to r
fo ur yea rs a nd has evo lved alo ng the way. It a ll ows fo r a comp re hensive v iew
of the Fi nance Mini sters ' assess ment of the state of the intern atio na l fi nanc ia l
system. re fo rm s th at have take n place. and proposa l to date. ' T he re po rt.
howeve r, is not necessaril y a set of po li cy commitm ents. Rath er it is a
pro posal prepared fo r the G7 leaders ' cons iderati on. No neth e le s. it prov ides
a useful mea ns fo r eva luatin g the ty pes a nd like lihood of re to nn to the
system .
Afte r rev iew in g the report. the ro le of the G7 as a body of g lo ba l
govern ance in the context of the inte rn ati ona l fi nanc ia l system is con ide red.
In lig ht of the centra li ty of the G7, the do minance of th e G7 econo mi e in
g lo ba l trade and ca pita l fl ows, a nd th e fac t that the G7 natio ns we re the
a rchitects of the current system. a set of res ponsibilitie is put fo rwa rd.
Fulfilm ent of these res po ns ibiliti es is critica l to the success a we ll -functio nin g
g lo ba l fin anc ia l system .
•

General Overview ()fAssess ment and Proposals
T he report of the Fin ance Mini sters re fl ects we ll the wo rk that has ta ke n place
s ince Ha li fax. The docum ent addresses the key areas of strengt he nin g and
reformin g internati ona l fin anc ia l in stitu t io ns ( IFls): e nhanc in g transpa re ncy
a nd promotin g best practices, strengthe nin g financ ia l regul atio n in ind ustri al
countr ies, stre ngthening macroeconomic po li c ies and fina nc ia l system in
e merg ing markets, improv ing c ri s is prevention and in vo lvi ng th e pri va te
sector. and pro motin g soc ia l po li c ies. At 28 pages in le ngth it i ind eed
comprehensive in its assess ment and lo ng in recomm end ati ons. T he repo rt
reads a a text on va ri ous refo rm s imple me nted. recomm e nded. and pro posed
fo r furthe r study. It does a n exce ll ent job of framing th e curre nt s itu atio n in
the most ge nera l sense. T he overa ll q ua lity of the doc um e nt refl ects the
effic ient wo rkin gs of the G7 Fina nce Mini sters' meetin gs a nd the com pete nce
of the current mini sters and the ir staffs.
T he repo rt makes it c lear that no new inte rn atio na l o rga ni satio ns are
needed (a po int w hi ch is e mphas ised aga in be low). T he theme of th e report
is that fo r internati ona l fi nanc ia l mark ets to work prope rl y. enhanced
tra nspa re ncy a nd di sclosure as we ll as imp roved regul ati o n a nd superv is io n
are necessary. In vo lvement of the pri vate sector in cri sis ma nage me nt a nd
preventi on, as we ll as requirin g the pri va te secto r to bear res po ns ibili ty fo r
ri sk ass umed, is a lso e mphas ised .
Some ofthe key recomm endati on a re that the 1M F a nd Worl d Ba nk need
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not only co-operate, but need also to forge a clear di vision of respons ibiliti es
between the two . Improved and increased transparency and acco untabili ty of
these instituti ons and other IFl s is pressed. Invo lvement of deve lop in g and
emerging nati ons is limited to the New Arrangements to Borrow (NA B), the
Interim Committee of the IMF, and the new Financial Stabi li ty Forum .4 A
number of other proposa ls are made for reformin g and improv in g the ex isting
IFls. We leave these to the experts in policy architecture to ga uge their merit.
The Mini sters report opens by stating that a "we ll -fu nct ioning
internati onal financial system is essential to all ow an effic ient allocation of
globa l sav in gs and investment, and provide the conditi ons needed to improve
world-wide growth and living standards in all countries". In th e process, it is
made clear that policy responsibility still rests with nati onal authorities and
what is envisioned is international co-operation rather than international
regulation. International in stitutions, pal1icul arl y the IM F and the World
Bank, are asked to improve perfo rm ance in core responsibilities. increase
transparency, clearl y delineate responsibi Iities, and co-operate rather than
in crease their scope of regulatory and supervisory acti vities.
.
Risk Management

Much attention is given to ri sk assessment. a challenging task in today 's
environment ofsophisticated financial engineering. Banks and other tinancial
intermediaries are the focus of reform, given the important role they play in
filling information gaps and allocating capital. The reform s of the Basel
Committee are held as the sta ndard that all cou ntri es should consider for
domestic impl ementation . Unf0l1unately, the rev isions have come under fire
for not doing enough and not being particul arl y useful to deve lop ing country
systems. Deve lopin g nations have argued that they would be at the mercy of
rati ng agencies, and though the new standards mi ght ti ghten co ntro ls over
banks in deve loped nati ons. may very we ll hurt banks in their nations (Diaz.
2000). C learl y the emphas is is minimi si ng market imperfect ions and
improv ing supervision of financial in stituti? n acti vity rather than regulating
it.
Capital control s are suggested for developing nations onl y as a transitory
too l while the financial sector develops and supervisory abi liti es improve. The
purpose is to limit unhedged short-term borrowing of developing country
banks. Though not a first-choice policy in strum ent. the views of the finance
mini sters are consistent with the literature suggesti ng that financial
deve lopment is a necessa ry condition for stab ility and foreign direct
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investment (FDI) is preferred to short-term capital flows. as FD I is not
destabilising. Eichengreen ( 1999) argues that such taxes are indeed warranted
in certain cases, but that they are a third-choice, where improvements in ri sk
management and regulatory abilities are the first and second choices. The
problem with capital controls is that they reduce the pressures on po licy
makers to implement the first and second choices. Further, as the report states,
they have not been a very effective in strument in most cases.
Private Sector Bail- In and Involvement

, Pri vate sector bail-in, that is hav ing pri vate sector investors as ume
responsi bility for ri sk undertaken, is not only a critical com ponent of crisis
management but also crisis prevention, as clear terms for bai I-in wou Id reduce
moral hazard. By forcing private sector participants to bear th e financial
consequences of their investment decisions through ehanges in debt financing
and the reduction of domestic and international safety nets, ex ante
expectations are changed and, it is assumed, a more conservative approach to
risk will be adopted .
The report outlines a framework that recomm ends linkin g offic ial support
to the country 's programme of meeting its debt obligations, balancing classes
of debt holders if the debt is to be restructured. estab li shin g a reserve tloor fo r
private sector contributions in relation to offic ial contributi ons and all owi ng
lending into arrears and the use of payment suspensions and capita l contro ls
in "exceptional" cases. The report further states that no category of private
creditors (bondholders) should be viewed as seni or to any other group
(banks). It concludes, however, with an acknowledgement that th e general
approach will remain to be applied on a case- by-case basis. Thi s refl ects the
disagreement that exists between, primarily, the Americans and other G7
members on how to bail in private bondholders. Because bonds do not
typically contain collective action clauses, rescheduling of thi s type of debt
is difficult, if possi ble at all. This has led to a mistaken belief that bondho lder
ri ghts are held higher than those of other debt holders (The Economist. 1999).
The pro blem with these types of provisions, as we ll as standst iII arrangements
and exchange controls, is that they may red uce the quality of the debt
in trum ent. Because of this, some have argued that they may actually create
an unstable environment that is conducive to a financial cri sis.
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Co-ordinaliol1 of Reform

Private sector :nvolvement in crises prevention is also called for. Little detail
is forthcoming on how to accomplish this, however. Eichengreen (1999, p. 7)
points out the obstacles to IMF-Ied standard setting and the need to rely on
private sector expertise as the "only practical way of promulgating effective
standards in the relevant areas". The number and variety of agencies involved
in financial architecture reform is quite expansive. In an attempt to categorise
the various bodies, the agencies and organisations mentioned explicilly in the
report are grouped according to their affiliation with international
organ isations, private sector organ isations, and the G7.
Those directly affiliated with the G7, or created by the G7, are the:
Financial Action Task Force, created by the G7 at the 1989 Paris Summit and
includes 26 member countries; G7 Financial Experts Group on Supervision
and Regulation in the Financial Sector: and the G7 Working Group on
Financial Crime. International organisations and affiliate bodies are: the
World Bank ; the IM F; the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB); the Interilil
Committee or International Financial Monetary Committee: the IMF / World
Bank Development Committee; the Financial Sector Liai on Committee
(FSLC): the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme
(FSAP); the United Nations (UN), and the Organisation for Economic 0operation and Development (OECD). Private sector-based bodies and
affiliates are; the BIS ; the Paris Club; the BIS Committee on the Global
Financial System (CGFS); the Financial tability Forum chaired by Andrew
Crockett, General Manager of the BIS and supported by a small secretariat at
the BIS; the Counter-party Risk Management Group; the International
Organisation of Securities Commiss ions (IOSCO); the Internationa l
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC); the Internationa l Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS); the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerate
(Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS); and the Core Principle Methodology
Working Group (Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS).
Far from being an exhaustive list. the above is merely a subset of the
bodies involved in reforming the financial ·architecture. It does illu trate,
however, the Finance Ministers ' point that no new international body i
needed . Rather what is essential for success is overall management of the
process that is already in motion .
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Exchange Rale Manage ment: A Special Problem

J

As di scu ssed earli er, the appropriate approac h to exchange rate manage me nt
is a perplexing pro ble m and continues to be a n area of practi ca l disagreement.
Many emerging nations choose to peg the va lue of their currency relati ve to
a vehic le currency because of their de pe ndence on do lla r-pri ced bas ic
commodities, to gain credibility and convertibility, to redu ce transactio n
costs, there by pro moting trade and in vestm ent, and as a means of fig hting
inflation. The re are, however, two practi ca l pro ble ms with ri g id exchange rate
reg im es.s The first is that they require ado pting nati ons to subju gate moneta ry
po li cy to exchange rate manageme nt rathe r than do mestic o bj ectives . Ma ny
natio ns res ist thi s by steril is ing exchange rate interventio ns, a practice that
cannot be susta ined. Hence, in the lo ng run the conduct of mac roeconom ic
po licy is ofte n incons istent w ith the exchange rate reg ime. The second i that
it encourages unhedged bo rrowing, as di scussed earlier.
The fin ance mini sters ' pos ition is that the excha nge rate regim e must be
bac ked by cons istent macroecono mic po lices . Further, they judge that the
internati ona l community should not prov ide offic ia l fin anc in g to co untri es
that peg thei r exchange ra te unless the excha nge va lue is susta ina bl e and
" certa in conditio ns" are met. T he repo rt is not firm on thi s issue a nd no
a lternative reg im es are offered deve loping countri es. Ex perie nce shows th at
bas ket- pegs a nd s ingle-currency-pegs w ill continue to be a popu lar c ho ice
a mo ng deve lo ping country po licymakers. They a re. however. d iffic ult to
susta in whe n the G7 nati ons do not co-ordinate o n the ir own exchange va lues.
What thi s means fo r deve lo pin g countries th at c hoose to peg to o ne or mo re
of these currencies is that, eventua lly, a reva luatio n o r deva luation must be
made. I f macroecono mic po licy or microecono mic reform were wa nting in the
interim, or if the adjustme nt to parity were postponed too lo ng, markets are
like ly to make these nati ons pay ha rshly for the ir sho rtcomings. This was the
case fo r East As ia n countries such as T hai land, Ma lays ia, and Indo nes ia,
whic h pegged o r managed their currencies aga in st a bas ket that attac hed a
la rge we ig ht to the US do lla r.

Emerging G7 Responsibilities
Fischer (1999) po ints o ut that the reform of the internatio na l fi nancia l
arc h itecture rea lly mea ns m icroeconom ic and macroeco nom ic correctio ns
underta ken by the deve lo pin g nati ons - the rec ipi ents of capita l tl ows - the
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deve lo ped nati ons - th e o ri g inators of ca pita l fl ows - and IFls. C lea rl y the
po ints of e mph as is in the G7 re port, banking refo rm a nd inc reased
transpa re ncy fo r example, are required by a ll pa rti c ipants of the syste m, but
are prim a ril y directed at the rec ipient nati ons. What is the ro le of the G7 as an
in stitutio n w ith g lo ba l leadership res po ns ibilities?
T he G7 natio ns are in a unique pos itio n in regard to the new fi na nc ia l
arc hitecture. T hey are the architects of the c urrent system, as deta il ed by
Ni cho las Bay ne in C hapter 2. T hey a lso dominate g loba l markets in term s of
trade and capita l fl ows, and are the issue rs of the wo rld 's ve hi c le c urrenc ies.
T hey have, therefo re, spec ia l res po ns ibiliti es fo r its reform . Based o n the
po ints put fo rwa rd in th is chapte r, the fo ll ow ing 7 ro les fo r the G7 are
suggested.

1. Actively Serve as the New Financial Architecture ',\' (jeneral Contractor
T he G7 should co-ordinate and set agendas, establish time lin es fo r resul ts,
a nd make recommendatio ns for research. As an institutio n, the G7 does not
have any " turf' issues w ith other organi satio ns, it is not an age nt of any
o rga ni sation (other than the leaders themse lves), a nd ca n exerc ise
conside rable contro l over ma ny in stituti ons suc h as the IMF. Be ing at the
centre of the process, the G7 Mini sters must ta ke res pons ibili ty fo r coo rdinating the process, serve as the dri vin g fo rce fo r implementati o n, a nd act
as the lead ing advocates of the benefits of capita l market Iibera li satio n.

2. Co-ordinate and/or Co-operate among Themselves
T he G7 mu st acti ve ly co-operate, and when practica ll y feas ibl e, co-ord in ate
mi croeconomic a nd macroeco nomic po lices . Co-ope rati on is needed o n
microeconomi c po lic ies, such as fin anc ia l market regul atio ns a nd taxes so as
not to create di sto rti ons that lead to an ineffi c ient flow of ca pita l. Coo rdination o n de bt-ho lder c la uses is needed s ince no country w ill unil atera ll y
ado pt suc h c lauses and run the ri sk of lowerin g the qu a l ity of th e ir de bt.
Macroeconomic co-operation is need to ma inta in a enviro nm ent conduc ive to
sta ble capita l fl ows, inc ludi ng exchange rate stabili ty a nd the avo ida nce of
un susta ina bl e exte rn a l defic its.

3. Encourage Competition
T he G7 must e ncourage compet ition, parti cul arl y Illult i late ra I trade
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liberali sation and the Multilateral Agreement on In ve tment (MA l). As
discussed earlier, trade liberali sati on is a precursor to financialliberali ati on.
Without it, di tortions ex ist that result in the ineffic ient di stributi on of cap ital
with bubbl es resulting in particular sectors of the economy. Competition is
al 0 required in the bankin g sectors of both developed and deve lop in g nat ions
to ensure a hea lthy system of intermedi aries.
-I. Encourage and Allow jar Broader Participation

The G7 should, and will, remain an exc lusive club. It should all ow. however
and whenever appropriate, broader participation. In clu sion of the developing
and emerging nations will enhance the credibility of reform s that are
forthcom ing from the process and give these nations ome "ownership" of the
process. These two aspects are certainly needed to summ on th e political will
for change, given the current backl ash that ex ists ~a in s t integrati on. and the
political will to endure in the mid st ofa cri is.

5. Continue Work on Standards
Because of the dynamic nature of financial markets, financial engineering,
and the activities of multinational enterprises, appropri ate standard s and best
practices are not static. The G7 is the body th at mu st see that work on
transparency. corporate governance, and ri sk management sta ndards
continues, even though stab ility may temporarily return.

6. Provide Incentives
Many of the reform measures mention ed above require maj or chan ge and
unilateral adoption by developing nati ons. The G7 must enco urage the ir
adoption by providing incenti ves and reward s for those co untri es th at conform
and maintain compliance. The Council on Foreign Relations (1999, p. 172)
refers to this as " Rewards for joining the Good Housekeeping Club" . These
incentives would include co nditi onin g lending term s with performance and
redu cing regulatory ca pital req uirements for banks. The G7 mu I also avoid
generati ng market distortions through its own regulato ry action . uch a the
tand ards for cap ital req uirements are all eged to have done.
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Do Not Over-Advertise
T he G7 must avo id overstating, o r a ll ow ing to be overstated, the beneti ts of
modest refo rm measures suc h as improved transpa re ncy a nd survei ll ance.
Financ ial cri ses w ill occas iona ll y occur; that is the nature of the beast.
O ve rstating the effects redu ces the credibility o f re fo rm e ffo rts in th e eyes of
the most shrewd market participants whil st understating the ex i ting ma rket
risk to those participants less savvy.
The internati onal fin anc ial architecture is a public good and. the refore. its
reform affects many nati ons outs ide of the G7. G ive n the centra lity of the G7
in g lo ba l govern ance, however, the G7 fi nds itse lf in a unique pos ition o r
res po ns ibility . T he seven res po ns ibilities outlined above co nst itute a n
important ro le fo r the G7 Mini sters. Meeting these o bligatio ns is critica l for
a credibl e and ba lanced approach to strengthe ning the inte rn ati o na l fi na nc ia l
a rc h itecture.

Conclusion
Capita l ma rket liberalisation offers deve loping natio ns the cap ita l neces ary
fo r growth a nd inc reased stand ards ofl iving. Increas ing capita l mob ili ty i the
mea ns fo r mo re effic ie nt capi ta l a ll ocatio n and wo rld-wide econo mic ga in s
that resul t. T hese benefits, however, are accompa ni ed by ri sks that pe rvade
fi nanc ia l markets. T he appro priate approach to reform of the in te rn ati o na l
fin anc ia l a rc h itecture is one that seeks to max im ise the benetits wh iIe
minimi s ing the ri sks.
The Report of th e Finance Mini sters to the Ko ln Econom ic Summ it is a
li ving docum ent th at refl ects the e fforts of the G7 and va rio us inte rn ati o na l
and do mestic o rgani sations reform efforts s ince the Ha lifax Summit in 1995 .
T he recomm endati ons co nta ined in the re port are conservati ve in nature a nd.
in cases where di ffe re nces in opin ion re ma in , ma inta in a market-o rie nted
approach. As such, few deta il s are g ive n, makin g impl ementatio n in ma ny
areas mo re di ffic ult. Furthe r, as re fl ected ' in the report, a vast num ber of
o rga ni satio ns, age nc ies, a nd comm ittees are in vo lved in the proce 's a nd
overa ll co-o rd ination presents a dau ntin g task. No neth e less, a ppro priate
pri vate secto r ex perti se is inc luded in for ming acco untin g and a udi t in g
sta nda rds, and sta ndards fo r supervis io n, regul atio n, transpa rency. pri va te
secto r invo lve me nt, and ri sk management a re th e core e leme nts needed for
effective reform . The most important c ha ll enge that the G7 now face is to co-
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ordinate the process and , as stated in the report, ··to encourage
implementation" . The endurance of the G7 in this regard wi ll ultim ately
determine the success or failure of reform.

Notes

2

3
4

5

See Jeffrey A. Frankel ( 1999) for an excellent and intuiti ve di scuss ion on thi s issue.
See Daniels. ToumanotT. and von der Ruhr ( 1999) for a di sl:uss ionof the currencybasket-peg arrangements and estimates of their currency wci ghts lu r these nation s.
Till: reliability of communiques as a public record of policy intentions is now IV<!II
establi shed in the literature. t!.g .. von Furstenberg and Daniels. 1992.
I-Icncc. we concur with Duncan Wood 's position in Chapter 4 that much more lH:eds
to be done to include the likely candidates of the next signilicant cri sis. the large
de veloping nation s experiencing linancialliberali sation and tinancial development.
In addition to the tlVO papers on thi s subj ect that appear in thi s text. sec Eichengreen
e f al. (1999) lor an analys is of the probl'em of transition Irom one regime to anothcr.
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